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W ithin interdisciplinary re­
search on language and 
mind over recent decades 
we’ve seen certain key dif­
ferences in approach emerg­
ing: while some argue for 
the importance of general 
cognition in  making lan­
guage possible (categoriza­
tion, attention, inference, 
etc.), others argue for innate 
language-specific capacities. 
But both of these stances focus on the relationship 
between language and the individual mind. O ther 
developments in  research on the special properties of 
social interaction suggest the need to focus on under­
standing the nature of language as a fundamentally 
social-interactional resource. This lecture discusses 
ways in  which language is not only a tool for social 
action and for the maintenance of social relations, 
but is also fundamentally designed for, and by, these 
functions. Examples are drawn from systems of refer­
ence (to  persons), systems for managing conver­
sation (turn-taking), and the role of micro-level social 
interaction in  macro-scale linguistic processes.
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Meneer de rector magnificus, zeer geachte toehoorders,
H et is een eer om benoem d te worden to t hoogleraar op de Radboud Universiteit 
Nijmegen. Van een langdurig proces was de allerlaatste stap ook de allerleukste: 
he t ‘kennismakingsgesprek’ bij de voorzitter van de college van bestuur de heer De 
W ijkerslooth en de rector magnificus de heer Kortmann. Op die dag ging ik naar 
de kam er van De W ijkerslooth, stropdas aan, om de hoge heren te leren kennen. 
En die w aren ontzettend vriendelijk. Ik: ‘Goedemorgen, Hoe m aakt u het?’ De 
W ijkerslooth: ‘Alles goed m et jou?’ ‘Prima, dank u wel’. Toen kwam de heer Kort­
m ann  binnen: ‘W il je m isschien een kopje koffie?’ ‘Graag, dank u .’ Na een paar 
m inu ten  kon de heer De W ijkerslooth er n ie t meer tegen: ‘Je k u n t gewoon “jij” 
zeggen hoor’. Ik verstond ‘m  n ie t goed: ‘W at zegt u?’. ‘Zeg m aar “jij” !’. Ik m ocht 
hem  gewoon gelijk gaan tutoyeren. Toen ging h e t w at soepeler: we hadden h e t over 
waar ik vandaan kom, hoe he t me bevalt in  Nederland, enzovoort. En toen kwam 
dé vraag, de enige die eigenlijk echt telde. De W ijkerslooth vroeg zich af: ‘W at is 
dat nou  eigenlijk, jouw leeropdracht, de “etnolinguïstiek” ?’ Ik had m eteen een 
m ooi voorbeeld paraat: ‘D at “u /jij”-gedoe, zonet, dat is precies he t soort ding dat 
wij in  de etnolinguïstiek bestuderen. Afhankelijk van welke taal je spreekt, kun  je, 
of m oet je soms, bepaalde dingen uitdrukken. In he t Nederlands bijvoorbeeld 
m oet je een keus tussen u en jij maken, en die keus draait om sociale factoren zo­
als solidariteit en m acht. Jij m ocht mij n e t als eerste tutoyeren, m aar n ie t anders­
om. Toch? H et gebruik van dit soort systemen hang t ook samen m et verschillen in 
cultuur, zoals verschillen tussen oude en jonge generaties in  Nederland, of tussen 
sprekers van verschillende talen  in  verschillende culturele omgevingen. Kijk m aar 
naar he t gebruik van tu /vous in  he t Frans.’ Zo ging he t ongeveer. W at mij betreft 
liep h e t gesprek goed af. H et allerbelangrijkste: ik was geslaagd. ‘H et wordt pas 
m aandag officieel,’ legde de heer Kortm ann uit. ‘Hier wordt in  een vergadering 
over gestemd, m aar h e t is een commissie van m aar drie personen, en wij twee 
stem m en allebei “ja”, dus -  je ben t door. Proficiat.’
Zo eindigt d it verhaaltje, en zo begint het verhaal van deze inaugurele rede.
In 1968, linguist Noam  Chomsky defined a goal for linguistics w ith this question: ‘W hat 
contribution  can the study of language make to  our understanding of hum an  nature?’ 
(Chomsky 1968:1 ) A subsequent tradition of language research has proposed insights 
about th a t part of hum an nature we call the mind. The scope of these insights was narrow. 
M uch of the research on language and m ind has focused on the individual in  isolation, 
w ith little regard for perform ance or com petence in  a social environm ent. This is a 
problem because the hum an m ind is an essentially social m ind (M ead 1934 ; Vygotsky
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1962 / 1934 ; D unbar 2003 ; Frith and Frith 2007 ). Homo sapiens is famously defined as 
the ‘rational anim al’, b u t w hat really makes us unique is our sociality.
The term  hum an sociality denotes more th a n  a single faculty or skill. It captures a 
constellation of our socially-oriented cognitive capacities. These capacities include our 
awareness or imagined awareness of people’s m ental states, w hat people can see and 
hear, w hat people know and don’t  know, and w hat knowledge people share. They in ­
clude the capacity to attribute in ten tions and goals to  others (as well as an incorrigible 
tendency to make such attributions to non -hum an  entities as well), and our capacity 
to  anticipate and m onitor others’ attributions of those goals to ourselves. They include 
our micro-political motives and the cognition we devote to  m onitoring hum an relation­
ships in  large and complex social groups.
These issues were explored by contributors from  a range of disciplines in  the book 
Roots o f  H um an Sociality (Enfield and Levinson 2006b). Their contributions convinced 
me th a t a proper investigation of hum an  nature m ust take seriously the core concerns 
of multiple, often disparate research traditions. For example, it’s essential to address 
m ind and brain, although n o t everyone thinks so. O ne participant a t the Roots o f  
H um an Sociality conference in  N orth  Carolina in  2004  suggested th a t cultural activities
-  such as talking on the telephone -  could be analyzed and understood w ithout refer­
ence to  psychology or neurocognition .1 Gyorgy Gergely memorably retorted: ‘Try doing 
it  w ithout a brain’. True, and the re’s a counter-retort: Try doing it  w ithout a culture. 
O ur norm al skills, as observed in  both ethnography and experiments, are utterly depend­
en t on a social and cultural environm ent, particularly for the ir development. It is as 
absurd to imagine th a t a m an could talk on the phone w ithou t a m ind or brain as it is 
to  imagine th a t he could do so w ithou t having been socialized in  a rich cultural envi­
ronm ent.
For researchers who focus on the isolated individual, a socio-cultural environ­
m en t can be daunting because of its diffuse and enorm ous ontology. Society and cul­
ture are constructed above and beyond the lifetime and m ind  of any individual, and so 
to  participate in  cultural activities -  from  giving ritual alms to m onks to  taking the bus 
to  work -  we can’t  act alone. None of us invented these activities. W e’ve inherited  them  
from  a long historical line of cultural transm ission and development. Social conven­
tions are n o t only distributed over tim e in  this way, they also need to be cognitively 
distributed in  social space, if jo in t activity is to  be realized a t all. This is true for a wide 
range of activities from  organizing a wedding to runn ing  a space station. Each is a prod­
uct of the hum an  m ind. Each operates by the hum an  hand. But neither springs from  a 
single m ind or runs by a single hand.
Part of the puzzle of hum an nature is to  figure ou t w hat connects us as individuals 
w ith  the cum ulative cultures of which we are an integral part. In Roots, we proposed a 
model for hum an nature in  which these two critical parts of the equation -  individual 
cognition at one end and collective culture a t the other -  are connected by social
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interaction  (Enfield and Levinson 2006a). Social interaction  is w hat links m inds w ith 
minds, and m inds w ith  culture more generally. Language can be studied a t each of these 
three levels, and i t  m ust be. At the level of m ind, language can be found in  the psycho­
logical representations we carry around w ith us, the structures th a t control the processes 
of speech production and com prehension, and th a t m ust be neurally instantiated. At 
the level of culture, language is a public system above and beyond any single individu­
al’s em bodim ent of it. It has accum ulated th rough long historical processes of trans­
m ission lasting generations, and it is learned in  specific forms th a t are given by the 
social environm ent one inherits as an accident of b irth . And, a t the level of social in ter­
action, language can be found in  the m om ent-by-m om ent practice of social relation­
ships, in  w hich we observe language in  the wild, where we learn it bo th  as children and 
as adults, and where the psychological processes of language production and com pre­
hension come together and are exercised. No single level is a privileged locus for lan ­
guage. Yet m ost traditions of research in  linguistics focus on just one of them .
How, then , are we to  use language to  study hu m an  nature? We s ta r t by recog­
nizing th a t language is a natural phenom enon and treating it as such. ‘The fact th a t 
m an is the anim al w hich has relatively recently succeeded in  dom inating all the others 
does n o t m ean th a t he is therefore exempt bo th  from  being an anim al and from  being 
studied as such.’ (Tiger and Fox 1966:80) Language, then, is a kind of anim al social 
behaviour. This makes it a subject for hum an  ethology, though surprisingly it has been 
little studied in  th a t field. More atten tion  has been paid to non-verbal com m unication, 
where direct com parison across species is m ore feasible (Hinde 1972). Like other bio­
logists, ethologists recognize the priority of fieldwork. ‘Science begins w ith  the 
description and categorization of the events it studies.’ (Eibl-Eibesfeldt 1970) This is 
how linguistics needs to  work and it is why we go to  great lengths to  study language in 
the wild.
Among the m any things we see w hen we look at language in  the wild is th a t 
language is n o t merely a means for passing on in form ation -  i t  is our prim ary tool for 
social action. O ur m any and varied social goals can be classified under macro-motives 
including m anipulating others by getting them  to do things, helping and inform ing 
others, based on prosocial motives, and sharing experience w ith  others to build social 
affiliations. The im portance of these macro speech acts has been well known for decades 
and reported on in  research on language and interaction  in  anthropology and sociology 
(Jakobson 1960 ; Austin 1962 ; Hymes 1964 ; G offm an 1981; D unbar 1996, in ter alia). 
These ideas have also been prom oted in  recent work in  psychology (Tomasello 2008 ).
So this is the stance I’m  taking here: hum an sociality is a t the heart of language. 
We now explore this in  three domains. First, reference, using a language-specific gram ­
m ar and lexicon. Second, structures of interaction such as turn-taking, which are seldom 
taught in  linguistics. And third, system transm ission, the ways in  w hich languages and 
other cultural systems are transm itted  at a level above and beyond the individual.
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r e f e r e n c e
If a speaker wants to refer to  a person or th ing using language, w hat is the nature of the 
task? There are two simple principles. D on’t  under-tell. D on’t  over-tell. (Cf. Schegloff 
2007a; Enfield 2007 .) If we give too little inform ation our conversation partner w on’t 
know w hat we’re talking about. And we should avoid giving too m uch inform ation, at 
the very least to avoid unnecessary effort, b u t also to avoid insulting the o ther’s in te l­
ligence. From these two principles certain  patterns emerge. Take a typical case from  a 
US English telephone call (Sacks and Schegloff 2007 / 1979). Speaker A’s first reference 
to  a person -  a schoolteacher A and B once had -  is made in  very specific term s, using 
the person’s nam e (K uhleznik). Immediately after this, the next reference to the same 
person, this tim e by Speaker B, is done in  semantically very general term s, by m eans of 
a simple pronoun  (her).
A: Did they get rid  of K u h lezn ik  yet?
B: No, in  fact I know somebody who has h e r  now.
If our only concern in  referring to  people was to make it clear to  whom  or w hat we are 
referring, while m inim izing the effort required to do so, then  this is the only pattern  
we’d see. But m anaging inform ation in  this sense is n o t our only concern. O ur choice 
of referential strategy is also guided by considerations related to social affiliation, a 
concern th a t is no  less im portant.
Speakers sometimes refer to  people in  unexpected ways. Here’s an Italian case 
from  a video-recorded conversation between a young m an Enzo and his m other (Stivers 
2007 ), in  w hich Enzo refers to his younger brother Roberto (the m other’s other son). 
There are several strategies Enzo could choose when referring to  Roberto here. A default 
form  would be to  refer to him  by nam e. O ther strategies include kin-based associative 
form ats such as ‘my b ro ther’, or the form  he actually selects in  this case: ‘your other 
son’.
Tu devi dire all' altro tuo figlio di decidersi.
‘You m ust tell y o u r o th e r  so n  to  make up his m ind.’
By referring to Roberto w ith this non-typical form ulation, Enzo is clearly doing some­
th ing  out of the ordinary. He did n o t choose this particular way of referring to  Roberto 
simply to  convey th a t i t ’s Roberto whom the m other should tell. For that, he could 
simply have said Roberto. By saying ‘your other son’, Enzo positions him self in  a par­
ticular way w ith respect to Roberto. We know from  the context th a t Roberto is creating 
problems for Enzo and his m other th rough indecision on a m atter of concern to  all 
three. By referring to him  as ‘your other son’, Enzo exploits two properties of this atypical 
form ulation, the first by w hat i t’s not, the second by w hat it is. (See Stivers 2007 .) So:
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first, by being atypical, the form ulation ‘your other son’ stands out as n o t the norm al 
way to talk, and thereby signals th a t some special message is intended. Second, through 
w hat it actually does say, ‘your other son’, signals w h a t it is th a t this special message 
aims to achieve. Here Enzo is distancing him self from  Roberto and from  any blame for 
causing the problems. This is done partly th rough the use of ‘your’, associating the 
referent w ith  ‘you’, and partly by the use of ‘o ther’. Both serve to  express distance be­
tween the referent and the speaker, a function  th a t is well suited to this context.
Phenom ena of this kind were well described by the philosopher Grice ( 1989) and 
later refined by others (e.g. Levinson 1983, 2 0 0 0 ). W hen we say som ething in  a non- 
typical way and therefore in  a way th a t attracts atten tion  by being noticeable for its 
non-typicality, it will be understood to have a special added message. This pragmatic 
effect can be socially strategic, as in  the Italian example, b u t it can also arise u n ­
intended. In an example from  a UK telephone call (Land and Kitzinger 2005), Janice is 
talking to an insurance salesman. She says she wants insurance for ‘self and spouse’. 
Presumably from  a statistical bias, the salesm an takes the word spouse w hen spoken by 
a w om an to refer to  a m an. Soon after, he says ‘you said you’d like to insure your hus­
band to drive the car’. This analysis tu rns ou t to be wrong, and Janice corrects him, 
saying ‘It’s n o t my husband, i t ’s my wife’, th en  getting straight back to the business of 
the call.
In Janice’s utterance ‘It’s n o t my husband, i t’s my wife’, there is a m ism atch be­
tween social categories encoded in  English: ‘w om an’ on the one hand, and ‘person who 
has a wife’, on the other. It has been shown th a t such m ism atches have consequences 
for w hat happens in the brain. In one study, subjects’ brain activity was measured while 
they listened to sentences like ‘Every night before going to bed I enjoy a nice beer’ (Berkum 
et al. 2008 ). In a congruent condition, the speaker is an adult, while in  another condi­
tion  the speaker is a young child. The m ism atch between the social category of the 
speaker (child) and the con ten t of expression (enjoying a nice beer) has an observable 
effect on brain activity. There is an increased negativity in  electrophysiological activity 
in  the brain  on hearing the key word beer spoken by a child (compared to  w hen hearing 
an adult say it). W ith  th is kind of data, we see th a t apparent speaker-message m is­
m atches -  like a child saying ‘I enjoy a nice beer’ or Janice saying ‘It’s my wife’ -  have 
consequences in  the brain.
W ith  data from  social interaction  we can also see the consequences of these m is­
m atches for everyday life. Returning to our example, a little while after Janice has said 
‘It’s n o t my husband, i t’s my wife’, the salesm an takes the opportunity to apologise for 
having assumed th a t by ‘spouse’ she m eant ‘husband’. But while his in ten tion  is to 
right a wrong, he may be making things worse by tu rn ing  Janice’s sexuality in to  the 
topic of conversation. W hile i t  is safe to assume th a t this was n o t an aim of Janice’s 
original form  of reference ( ‘spouse’), the unexpected nature of her second reference 
( ‘my wife’) did in  fact have th is result.
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These examples show how different ways of referring to  people n o t only serve an infor­
m ational imperative (to successfully achieve reference to  a person, place or th ing) bu t 
also serve social goals. Some linguistic systems elaborate this social side of reference in  
the structure of the grammar. Many European languages give speakers an apparently 
simple choice between two words for ‘you’ (Brown and G ilm an 1960). In Dutch, for 
example, the choice is between the fam iliar/inform al jij and the polite/form al u . These 
two words for ‘you’ differ in  perceived level of politeness, distance, or formality, along 
lines well described for m any European languages. Their norm s of usage are never en­
tirely straightforward, even for native speakers. To use them  incorrectly, or to be unsure 
w hich is proper for an occasion, can be mildly traum atic.
In Lao -  a language of m ainland Southeast Asia -  the problem of selecting pro­
nouns is of another order altogether. There are n o t two words for ‘you’, b u t four, on 
four d istinct levels, roughly characterized as formal, polite, familiar, and bare. But n o t 
only are there four words for ‘you’, there are also four words for ‘I’ on the same four 
levels, and four words for ‘he’ and ‘she’ (in  fact there are effectively even more, using 
other strategies; Enfield 2007 :78). Navigating these social categories th rough the choice 
of pronoun -  a recurring problem th a t speakers need to solve -  can be tricky to  say the 
least.
‘i ’ ‘y o u ’ ‘s h e / h e ’
b a r e kuu3 m ùng2 m an2
f a m i l i a r haw2 too3 law2
p o l i t e khòòj5 caw4 phen1
f o r m a l khaa5-phacaw4 thaan1 thaan1
Lao personal pronouns (singular form s)
We should n o t expect to find a system like the Lao one in  just any language. Such a 
system can only emerge am ong people who are particularly concerned about differen­
tia tion  in  the world of social relations. So it is w ith speakers of Lao. We know from  the 
ethnographic record th a t Lao speakers have a variegated and uneven social world. It is 
as if  each person is on a g iant slow-moving escalator, where everyone else is either 
above or below you, and your relative position gets higher as you get older. Only a few 
others fit on the same step as you, for example those born  in  the same year, who you’ve 
known since early childhood. The positions of other people have to  be m onitored care­
fully in  daily life.
This tilted social system is ultim ately rooted in  the inheren t asymmetry of sibling 
order. Even am ong twins it  m atters who was born  first. The fact th a t one of two sisters 
is older and the other is younger has a range of consequences. It accounts for differ­
ences in  their rights and responsibilities in  life, including differences in  how they talk
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to, and about, each other. If you had a conversation in  Lao w ith  two sisters, it w ouldn’t 
m atter w hether they were young children, or in  their 20s, or in  their 80s. You could 
im m ediately tell from  the way they talk to each other w hich is the younger and which 
is the older of the two, in  a way th a t a language like English doesn’t  reveal. From the 
vagueness of the word brother to the egalitarian mode of talking th a t we adopt in  Eng­
lish, you could share several m artin is w ith me and my brother M att w ithout knowing 
w hich is the older, a t least n o t from  the words we use. Only more subtle cues would tell 
you who is more m ature.
The above-below organization of Lao-speaking society is n o t just reflected in  overt 
linguistic practices and in  other conscious types of behaviour. There are more subtle cues 
as well. In research on hand  gestures th a t accompany speech, Lao speakers produce 
pointing gestures th a t sketch kinds of diagrams in  m id-air (Enfield 2009 , chapter 6). 
W ith  some consistency, speakers will po in t upwards when referring to people who are 
socially higher and they will po in t downwards w hen referring to people who are socially 
lower, often w hen there is no th ing  in  the spoken signal th a t reveals these ‘above’ and 
‘below’ relations. The unreflective nature of these spontaneous pointing gestures reveals 
the depth of Lao speakers’ concern w ith hierarchy in  the social world.
We can thus imagine th a t w hen it comes to simply referring to someone in  con­
versation, this deep concern w ith  relative difference in  social standing should come 
in to  play. Suppose we know a w om an nam ed M on2. If I w an t to  tell you th a t I saw M on2  
a t the market, in  English I will typically simply use her first nam e, as in  I saw  M on2 at 
the m arket today. But standard practice in  Lao requires me to choose from  a range of 
title prefixes, selected according to  the position of th a t person above or below the social 
line w ith  respect to myself as a speaker. Perhaps M on2  is in  the grandparent category, 
in  w hich case I’ll refer to her as tuu4-m on2  (tuu4  m eaning ‘grandparent’). O r if M on2  
is a younger sister to my father (or equivalent), I’ll refer to her as qaa3-mon2 (qaa3 
m eaning ‘father’s younger sister’). O r she’s below me -  a niece or daughter or equivalent
-  th en  I’ll refer to  her as qii1-m on2, using the ‘lower fem ale’ title prefix qii1-. W hen Lao 
speakers make a simple reference to a person, som ething they m ust do all the time, they 
draw accurately and explicitly on an obligatory concern for relative social position. By 
comparison, in English John may be referred to as John, regardless of his social category or 
relationship to the speaker. But it is no t the case th a t the Lao system reveals an ideology of 
social relations while the English system does not. English reflects different cultural 
concerns, nam ely an Anglo value of egalitarianism , the ideal th a t everyone in  a social 
group is at the same level. This is symbolized th rough a system in w hich a m an will be 
referred to in  one and the same way, regardless of age, rank, or serial number.
There are bo th  simpler and more complex systems for referring to people, as the 
above examples reveal. Each of these cases shows th a t w hen speakers need to make 
reference -  a basic function  of language -  they are required to  pay careful atten tion  n o t 
just to  m anaging inform ation, b u t to social affiliation as well.
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i n t e r a c t i o n a l  s t r u c t u r e  
Observation of language in  hum an  interaction  reveals structures th a t we are n o t taugh t 
in  linguistics, though -  if we’re lucky -  we m ight encounter them  w ith in  a m arginal 
cluster of disciplines th a t include conversation analysis, ethnomethodology, and 
research on talk-in-interaction. A good example is the system of tu rn-tak ing  in  conver­
sation. Research on English telephone conversations in  the 1960s and 1970s led to the 
developm ent of a theory of tu rn-tak ing  designed to account for the following observed 
tendencies in  conversation: w hen someone is speaking, it should be just one person, 
and when someone else is to speak, the ‘floor’ will be transferred to  this new speaker, 
and this transfer of the floor is done w ith no gap and no  overlap between speakers 
(Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson 1974; cf. D uncan 1974). The claim is n o t th a t gaps and 
overlaps never occur. It is th a t speakers of English treat no-gap-no-overlap as a norm a­
tive target. Departures and failures will happen. However, the prediction is th a t they 
will be recognized as departures and failures, and treated as such.
Is this model of tu rn-tak ing  in  English found in  all languages? Many have 
suggested th a t the answer is no. It is reported th a t in  Nordic countries you m ight ask a 
question in  the m orning and n o t receive a reply un til the afternoon. O r at the other 
end of the spectrum  in New York City, a m an m ight be unable to get a word in  edgeways 
due to local norm s of fast tu rn-tak ing  and a preference for sim ultaneous speech. Is 
no-gap-no-overlap in  turn-taking a culture-specific norm? To test this question, colleagues 
and I carried out a systematic comparison of conversations, using video-recordings of 
everyday interaction  in  ten  languages from  five continents (Stivers et al. 2009 ). In order 
to  make a clear com parison, we focused on questions and responses. We m easured how 
long it  takes before people respond to a question. O ur findings did n o t support the 
hypotheses suggested by ethnographic reports. Instead, we found a robust com m onal­
ity in  tim ing of response across the ten  languages, where the average tim e of transition  
from  the end of one speaker’s tu rn  to the beginning of the o ther’s falls w ithin a small 
tim e window (a half second). There were differences between the w ithin-language 
means, b u t these involved variance of no more th an  a quarter second either side of a 
m ean for the languages as a set.
Why should there be this com m onality between languages? W hat prevents radical 
differences across cultures, resulting in  the average tu rn  transition  tim e in  one language 
being a long gap, while in  another language there is constant overlap? One reason is the 
natural semiotics of contiguity, i.e. the m eaning of two signs occurring in close proximity. 
The principle is fam iliar from  examples like this:
EXIT
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Because the word is adjacent to  the arrow, it’s easy for an interpreter to connect the 
two. This is why we don’t  hang the word exit on one side of the room  and an arrow on 
the other. People w on’t  see these two signs as connected. There’s a sim ilar imperative in 
turn-taking. If you w an t an utterance to  be heard as a response, th en  it should be close 
to  the utterance it is a response to.
But there’s another reason for n o t unnecessarily delaying one’s response. O ne of 
the m any dem ands th a t hum an  interaction  places on us is the requirem ent to  cooper­
ate w ith our conversation partners. We do this by attending to  w hat others are saying 
(so n o t attending to other things), and by responding in  ways th a t are relevant and th a t 
carry the conversation along. If this sounds trivial, th en  next tim e you sit down to 
breakfast or dinner w ith  your family or housem ates, see w hat happens when you are 
in tentionally  uncooperative in  in teraction (Garfinkel 1967). Try n o t answering their 
questions, or changing the subject every twenty seconds, or challenging everything by 
asking ‘Why do you say tha t?’ or ‘W hat exactly do you m ean?’ They will quickly get 
annoyed and they’ll stay annoyed w ith  you all day. Social interaction  involves a com ­
m itm ent to  carrying a jo in t project forward. To deliver a rapid response maximizes this 
forward progress, while to delay unnecessarily is, well, unnecessary.
This principle of cooperation is n o t only a guide for action, b u t a guide for in ter­
pretation. W hen a tu rn  is delayed, this delay is in terpreted against a default expectation 
of the kind of rapid response th a t would be m ost cooperative. Here’s an example from  
a UK English telephone call in  w hich Speaker A suggests th a t Speaker B come over and 
pick him  up (Levinson 1983:335).
A: W hat about coming here on the way?
((silence))
A: Or doesn’t  th a t give you enough time?
B: Well no I’m  supervising here.
After A makes his request, a silence is created by B’s non-response. If A assumes B’s 
contributions are guided by a cooperative principle, then  B’s delay canno t be random . 
B’s silence indicates trouble in  producing a response. O ne form  of trouble is an unwill­
ingness to produce a face-threatening response of non-com pliance, in  this case a rejec­
tion  of A’s request. Evidence th a t A interprets B’s delay in  this way is seen in  A’s next 
move: ‘O r doesn’t  th a t give you enough tim e?’ Speaker B then  confirms in  the last line 
th a t this was indeed the m eaning of his earlier failure to respond.
The presum ption of com m itm ent in  conversation can have far-reaching conse­
quences. W e’re all fam iliar w ith getting in to  a conversation and then  finding th a t i t’s 
n o t easy to get out. A colleague arrives a t work and says ‘I had the weirdest ride on the 
train  this m orn ing’. W hen you respond w ith  ‘Really? W hat happened?’, you’ve m ade a 
binding social contract. You’ve effectively said (a) ‘I w an t to hear w hat you’re offering
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to  tell m e’ and (b) ‘I’m  going to  listen to  your story through to the end’. As a listener 
you’ll display the recipiency th a t you’ve com m itted to, for example by keeping your eye 
gaze directed towards the speaker, and producing signals like u h -huh  th a t give or give 
off your atten tion  to the ongoing story-telling. Until the story reaches completion, 
there is no cheap or easy way to extricate yourself from the conversation, e.g. by suddenly 
saying ‘Okay see you later, bye’ and leaving the room  half way through the story. Because 
this com m itm ent in  conversation is a social contract, it gives you reasons for action 
th a t may be different from  your desires (Searle, 2 0 10 ).
Herb Clark’s work on language usage has long stressed the significance of social 
com m itm ent in  interaction. Clark (2006 ) took the no tion  of social com m itm ent and 
used it to  analyze the results of Stanley M ilgram ’s compelling 1960s social psychology 
experiments on authority  and obedience (M ilgram 1974). Milgram invited people to 
take p art in  a ‘learning experim ent’. Participants would m onitor another m an’s 
progress in  a m em ory test, and were required to adm inister electric shocks to the m an 
whenever he made errors. They did n o t know th a t this m an was a confederate, or th a t 
the shocks were fake. Subjects found themselves adm inistering shocks th a t they be­
lieved were painful, harm ful -  even fatal -  to a m an they’d just met, under instructions 
from  experimenters they’d just met. M ilgram’s results were interpreted  as having to do 
w ith  obedience to  social authority. Clark’s analysis emphasises the power of the social 
com m itm ents involved. A subject makes a social contract w ith the experimenter, and 
this social contract creates conflicting m otivations for action. Many subjects in  
M ilgram’s experiments found it easier to carry out to  the end the project they had com ­
m itted to  -  namely, finishing the experim ent th a t required them  to give electric shocks 
to  another m an -  even if they had n o t foreseen th a t the project would require them  to 
act against ano ther local desire (in this case, the desire n o t to harm  others). We experi­
ence this conflict in  conversation as well. After you’ve com m itted to  hearing som eone’s 
story by saying ‘Really? W hat happened?’, you’re highly likely to  listen th rough to the 
story’s conclusion and give an appropriate response, no  m atter how bored you may 
have become. The cost of sticking w ith  it to the end is evidently m uch lower th a n  the 
cost of abandoning the project half way th rough and betraying the social com m itm ent 
you made at the outset.
The cooperative principle in  conversation and related facts about the tim ing of 
responses to  questions are the tip of the iceberg when it comes to turn-taking. Turn- 
taking is a complex, m ulti-faceted phenom enon. In addition to the m oral aspects just 
discussed, the m any properties of tu rn-tak ing  as a system are barely understood and 
the ir cross-linguistic validity has yet to be tested. These properties include projection, 
speaker selection, tu rn  design, recipiency, response relevance, transition-tim e calibra­
tion, and sequence organization (Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson 1974; Schegloff 2006 , 
2007b). Turn-taking is a dom ain of language and sociality th a t will generously repay 
fu rther work.
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s y s t e m  t r a n s m i s s i o n  
How is i t  th a t languages can exist above and beyond the m inds and the lifetimes of their 
speakers? How are these systems distributed in  space and transm itted  through time? At 
b irth , we inherit n o t only a genetic makeup from  our parents (and  a line of genetic 
inheritance before them  going back to the beginning of life), we also inherit a system 
of culture and language th a t forms a niche in  the social environm ent we happen to 
be born  into. For bo th  tracks in  this dual inheritance model -  genes and culture -  a 
D arw inian approach posits variation in  the qualities of individuals in  populations, in ­
heritance of these qualities through some form  of replication, and selection of variants 
th rough com petition (D arw in 1859; Mayr 1970 ; Hull 1988).
To understand how this applies to  cultural systems such as languages it is neces­
sary to  th ink  in  term s n o t of the replication of whole systems b u t the replication of 
linguistic items or features (Nettle 1999; C roft 2 0 0 0 ; Muysken 2008 ), i.e. individual 
features of language such as words and gram m atical constructions. Why? Because indi­
vidual pieces of language are the things th a t are reproduced and copied and passed 
across in  face-to-face interaction. No specifiable causal process of replication operates 
on whole systems. Replication occurs a t the level of utterances and the linguistic items 
they are made up of. The causal site of this replication, and therefore of the entire proc­
ess of linguistic transm ission, is face-to-face interaction.
A linguist’s job is to describe the m odern products of h istorical processes. As the 
philosopher of language Ruth G arre tt M illikan ( 1984 :3) points out, if a linguistic device 
exists, this is proof th a t it has ‘served (com m unicative) functions’ and has ‘received 
stable reactions from  cooperating partners’. The repeated functional success of a lin ­
guistic item  at the micro level is criterial for its aggregated success a t the m acro level 
th rough finite (though enorm ous) chains of social transm ission. The causal processes 
of transm ission are well understood thanks to  a rich tradition  of sociological research 
on diffusion of innovations (Rogers 1995).
Once we understand why som ething has become a convention -  why it  succeeded 
as an innovation -  we will understand w hat causes an innovation to  survive and thrive. 
The goal is to identify the biases th a t operate on the transm ission of innovations, 
m aking sure n o t to le t the analysis become abstract or m etaphorical by losing sight of 
its concrete expression in  chains of instances of social interaction, the key locus of the 
causal process. Transmission biases will affect the career path  of innovations by ( 1 ) 
affecting the rate or likelihood of exposure to bits of language, for example through 
causing them  to come in to  social con tact w ith  innovators, (2 ) affecting the ease and 
m anner in  w hich the innovations are cognitively represented (e.g. due to  learning), 
and by (3) affecting exposed agents’ tendency to reproduce these bits of language and 
thereby expose others to them  in turn .
A range of factors can serve as biases in  transm ission. Consider some examples 
from  the case of structural convergence across language borders in  m ainland Southeast
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Asia (see Enfield 2 003 , 2005). The m odern introduction  of national frontiers has 
helped to restrict linguistic transm ission between nations, on the one hand, while 
enhancing transm ission w ithin nations’ borders, on the other. The spread of non- 
linguistic aspects of culture, such as Buddhist religion from  the West, has served to 
prom ote the transm ission of associated linguistic systems (e.g. words from  classical 
Indic languages such as Pali). Economic activity has brought people in to  contact w ith 
o ther languages; for example English in  post Second W orld W ar economic activity, or 
deeper economic and adm inistrative relations such as in  the case of V ietnam ’s servi­
tude to China. More th an  a m illennium  of dom ination by the Chinese transform ed the 
Vietnamese language radically from  its form er structure. Geography and its relation­
ship to  the livelihoods of different ethnolinguistic groups has prom oted inter-ethnic 
contact. In vast areas of m ainland Southeast Asia, certain  ethnolinguistic groups will 
prefer to  seek out flat lands where they can carry ou t w et rice farm ing in  paddies (e.g. 
speakers of languages from  the Tai language family), while other ethnolinguistic groups 
will prefer to  seek o u t the hillside land th a t supports a different kind of rice (and  other) 
agriculture (e.g. speakers of languages from  certain  branches of the Austroasiatic lan ­
guage family). Because m ainland Southeast Asia has the geography th a t it has, people 
of different ethnolinguistic groups come in to  close proximity (Leach 1964/ 1954), 
thereby increasing the likelihood of exposure to  elements of each other’s languages and 
the subsequent spread of these elements. Finally, there are personality differences 
am ong the people who make up the populations in  w hich language is spread and who 
cause pieces of language to spread and aggregate in to  systems in  hum an  populations. 
These differences play a role in  the success or failure of certain  innovations. Some 
people are more gregarious, more well-travelled, more likely to  travel fu rther afield, and 
therefore m ore likely to come in to  contact w ith  innovations. O f these, some will be 
m ore likely to be innovators while others will be more conservative, thus determ ining 
the likelihood of their reproducing any innovation they have encountered when they 
go to fu rther villages, thus exposing others in  tu rn . And of those th a t reproduce these 
innovations, some will be more charism atic th an  others and therefore m ore likely to be 
im itated.
These varied biases belong to  a model of transm ission of entire linguistic systems 
grounded in  processes th a t operate on individual pieces of language. These pieces are 
circulated a t ground level in  sequences of social interaction, and this process drives the 
eventual macro-level effect of system transm ission. We have a strong in tu ition  th a t 
languages do somehow get reproduced and passed on as a whole th rough generations. 
W hen a child learns the language of her ethnolinguistic group, we do n o t hesitate to 
say th a t she has m ore or less reproduced the entire language. But le t us n o t forget th a t 
this is shorthand. There is no single causal event of the language getting reproduced, 
parallel for instance to w hat happens w hen a new organism  instantly  acquires its entire 
genome in a sexual reproductive event. Instead, the child constructs the language piece
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by piece. The process occurs critically in  the early years of life when the child has a 
highly restricted social circle and w hen she is engaged in  intensive and alm ost exclusive 
social in teraction w ith  people of her own ethnolinguistic group (w ith whom, inciden­
tally, she is m ost likely to be genetically related, leading in  norm al circumstances to  the 
non-necessary com m on evolution of genes and language). At the very core of the 
language acquisition process is the essentially social environm ent of family and com ­
munity, and the essentially social process of com m unication. Linguistic knowledge is, 
therefore, in  the words of Wolfgang Klein, ‘essentially so c ia l’ (Klein 1996:10 4 ). Or, as 
he then  adds, ‘essen tia lly  social’.
In a natural, causal account of linguistic transm ission and change, the units of 
analysis will be ( 1 ) the linguistic items th a t form  the parts of a language and th a t com ­
prise populations of items or ‘m em es’ in  a community, (2 ) the people th a t make up the 
populations th a t carry these systems psychologically and use them  in com m unication, 
and (3 ) the face-to-face interactions th a t create the causal chains w hich define the 
history of these systems. These are the elements of an epidemiological approach to 
language transm ission and change (Enfield 2008 ; cf. Sperber 1985; Sperber 2006 ).
c o n c l u s i o n
We began w ith Chomsky’s question: ‘W hat contribution  can the study of language 
make to  our understanding of hum an  nature?’ His own answer was th a t ‘hum an  lan ­
guages are instan tiations of the same fixed biological endow m ent’ and th a t ‘they “grow 
in the m ind” m uch like other biological systems’ (Chomsky 2 0 0 2 ). This doesn’t  tell us 
m uch about hum an  nature. I th ink  there’s a different answer, and it is this. Language 
shows us the essentially social nature of hum an  nature. It shows us this in  num erous 
ways, and these ways show us why Chomsky’s answer can’t  be right. For one thing, 
language doesn’t  grow like an organ. Language is constructed. It’s constructed in  the 
m inds of those who learn and use it, in  the com m unities th a t exist and persist above 
and beyond those m inds and individual lifetimes, and in  the real tim e utterances th a t 
link people in  social interaction. For another thing, language is less like an organ and 
m ore like an organism. Like organisms, languages speciate. Evans points ou t th a t 
linguistics is n o t so m uch like logic or m athem atics, b u t ra ther ‘m uch m ore like the life 
sciences where the discovery of strange and unim agined new species constantly makes 
us revise our ideas of w hat is biologically plausible’ (Evans 2 0 10 :45). Hence the need to 
take linguistic diversity seriously.
So if we w ant to  know hum an  nature th rough language, we need to  know the 
diversity of hum an  natu re’s linguistic products. In the three dom ains discussed above
-  linguistic reference, social interaction, and system transm ission -  two have received a 
good deal of research. Resources for linguistic reference have been well m apped in  the 
deep history of gram m atical tradition. And system transm ission is intim ately known 
from  years of philology and sociolinguistics (though bo th  are in  urgent need of further
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work, especially in  areas of the world th a t have been less studied). But the structures of 
social interaction  rem ain uncharted  territory. We know little about the ir form  and 
variation globally. The solution to  this gap in  our knowledge is to  seek diverse forms of 
life in  the wild, to describe and properly categorize these forms of life, and to system­
atically compare them  in all the ir global forms. This will move us towards a com para­
tive tradition  of research on structures of social interaction, i.e. towards a typology of 
language use.
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